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The rise and decline of the coal industry occupies a central place in Britain’s industrial history. 
At its peak, immediately before and after the First World War, it constituted the largest industrial 
employer of male labour, around one in twelve of the population being directly dependent on it, 
while providing a key input to other industries and an important contribution to exports. Yet 
during the interwar years the industry witnessed a dramatic decline. By 1937 its employment and 
tonnage exported had fallen to only 63.1 per cent and 66.3 per cent of their 1924 values.
1 This 
was the product of a number of developments, including adverse movements in the demand for 
coal and the growth of international protectionism. Yet a major factor behind the British 
industry’s declining international competitiveness was its poor productivity growth. This, in 
turn, appears to have been closely associated with the slow diffusion of mechanization and 
associated production techniques. 
  One major strand of research into the industry’s performance has focused on the 
substantial regional differences among the British coalfields in work organization, geology, and 
other mining conditions.
 Such analysis, drawing principally on wide regional differences in the 
diffusion of mechanical coal-cutting, has suggested that Britain’s poor aggregate productivity 
performance was due, at least in part, to certain `problem regions’ where specific conditions 
inhibited mechanization.
2 Indeed, if government intervention, most notably through the 1930 
Coal Mines Act, had not limited industrial restructuring, it has been argued, the increased 
concentration of the industry in the newer and more environmentally-favoured coalfields of 
Yorkshire and the North Midlands would have increased productivity growth towards the 
European average.
 3 
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This article demonstrates that, while major geological differences did exist between the 
British coalfields, their interwar productivity growth was bunched towards the bottom of the 
European league table. This was largely due to the fact that they faced a common problem, of 
over-riding importance in inhibiting the development of mechanised mining throughout the 
British industry – the inability to mechanize main haulage (haulage on roadways delivering coal 
directly to the shaft). As the most authoritative contemporary technical appraisal of the pre-
nationalisation coal industry, the 1945 Reid Committee Report, emphasised, unmechanized main 
haulage placed a key bottleneck on throughput, which both inhibited mechanization further 
‘upstream’ and imposed a productivity ceiling on the mechanised technology that was 
introduced.
4  
Britain’s coal industry had become `locked-in’ to sub-optimal technology, via processes 
which have been illuminated in the literature on path dependence. Path dependence refers to 
dynamical, stochastic, systems in which local positive feedbacks provide self-reinforcing 
mechanisms directing the system towards particular outcomes, typically selected by the 
persisting consequences of transient conditions prevailing during the early history of the 
process.
5 As time progresses an industry’s installed base of technology selected to meet these 
transient conditions will become increasingly important in determining current choices 
regarding interrelated capital investment, inhibiting the introduction of superior new technology 
that is not compatible with existing plant.
6 Charles Kindleberger identified two forms of 
interrelatedness; technical interrelatedness - the need to modify various stages of a production 
process to accommodate a new technology; and institutional interrelatedness - the additional 
obstacles to modification arising from fragmented ownership of that process.
7  Fragmentation 
can impede technical change either due to coordination and transactions cost problems and/or as  
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a result of a-symmetries in the costs and benefits faced by the different parties.
8
The following section compares Britain’s interwar productivity experience with that of 
other European coalfields, demonstrating that all British coalfields had poor productivity growth 
compared to the European average, while their productivity levels fell below those of coalfields 
where the inherent difficulties of coal extraction were regarded as being on a par with Britain. 
Poor productivity growth is shown to have stemmed from the inability to mechanise haulage on 
main and secondary underground roadways, that both placed a ceiling on the potential 
productivity of mechanization further upstream and prevented the development of fully-
mechanized mining. This, in turn, stemmed from institutional interrelatedness between British 




In contrast to Britain, the major European coal producers enjoyed rapid interwar productivity 
growth. Between 1913 and 1936 the Netherlands increased output per man-shift (O/S) by 117.20 
per cent, while increases of 81.34 per cent were recorded in the Ruhr; 72.46 per cent in Polish 
Upper Silesia; 50.57 per cent in Belgium; 50.31 per cent in Czechoslovakia, 22.40 per cent in 
France (Pas de Calais); but only 9.63 per cent in the UK.
9 While in 1913 Britain’s O/S was only 
exceeded by the USA and Polish Upper Silesia (both of which had exceptionally good 
geological conditions), by 1936 it had also been overtaken by the Ruhr, Netherlands, and 
Czechoslovakia. 
 To what extent is Britain’s poor productivity growth due to certain problem regions, 
which mask the more respectable record of its other coalfields? Table 1 compares O/S for all  
  4 
British and European coalfields for which data are available, ranked according to their 1913-37 
O/S growth. No British coalfield other than Lancashire, North Staffordshire and Cheshire (LNC) 
manages to beat the growth performance of any continental coalfield, while even this region 
fails to match the European average. The British `1913’ data are based on a single month (June 
1914) and a sample covering only two thirds of collieries.
10 A comparison was therefore also 
made using the earliest interwar base year for which data are available for most coalfields, 1923. 
The British coalfields are again grouped at the bottom of the growth league, even LNC ranking 
above only a single continental producer – France. Finally, growth over the period 1923-29 is 
examined, as this excludes any suppression of British productivity growth arising from output 
restrictions under the 1930 Coal Mines Act. It also shows British O/S growth in a particularly 
favourable light, since it includes a significant increase in working hours following the British 
miners’ defeat in the 1926 strike. Yet even on this basis all British coalfields for which data are 
available have growth substantially below the European average. 
International comparison of mining productivity is complicated by the importance of 
natural conditions in determining potential productivity. Contemporary expert opinion, both in 
the UK and overseas, identified the USA and Upper Silesian coalfield as having superior 
conditions to Britain, though Britain was ranked ahead of most European coalfields and at least 
on a par with Holland and the Ruhr, which were viewed as the best comparators for assessing 
Britain’s mining productivity record.
11 In 1927 Holland and the Ruhr had roughly similar O/S to 
Britain, 1.02 and 1.13 metric tons respectively compared to Britain’s 1.05 metric tons (and 
values for individual coalfields ranging from 0.84-1.16 metric tons). However, by 1937 they had 
increased O/S to 1.77 and 1.63 metric tons respectively, compared to Britain’s 1.19 metric tons 
(with even the best coalfield achieving only 1.34 metric tons).
12 
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Comparing productivity in terms of output per hour (O/H) would portray Britain in an 
even less favourable light. Greasley estimated that hours worked per shift by hewers declined 
from 8.65 for most British coalfields immediately prior to the First World War to around 8.15 
during the 1930s.
13 Meanwhile most continental coalfields had experienced larger falls in 
working hours; between 1913 and the mid-1930s shift lengths had declined from 9-10.5 hours to 
8 hours 2 minutes in Poland, from 9.5 hours to 7 hours 20-28 minutes in Czechoslovakia; from 9 
hours to 8 hours 10 minutes in the Netherlands; from 9 to 7.75-8.25 hours in France; and from 9 
hours to 7 hours 50-55 minutes in Belgium. In the Ruhr the shift length fell from 8.5 hours in 
1913 to 8 hours in the mid-late 1920s, and 8 hours exclusive of winding time by the mid-
1930s.
14   
Poductivity comparisons would, of course, ideally be made in terms of total factor 
productivity (TFP) rather than labour productivity. Unfortunately no TFP estimates are available 
for contintental coalfields (or for British coalfields – other than at the coalface).
15 However, 
British coalfield-level data provide an indication of the relative impact of mechanization on 
labour and other costs. Table Two compares the growth of mechanization in six British 
coalfields (ranked according to the increase in the proportion of coal mechanically conveyed), 
together with changes in costs per ton of coal mined, from 1927-37. The two areas that exceed 
the national average for the growth in mechanical conveyance (the best available proxy for 
overall mechanization, as discussed below) over this period, LNC and Yorkshire, also achieved 
the highest reductions in production costs. These mainly arose from labour cost savings, though 
other costs also fell. While differences in cost changes between coalfields were influenced by a 
number of factors, the Table does demonstrate that mechanisation (at least for upstream 
operations) was not associated with any significant increase in non-labour costs. Furthermore,  
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given that British collieries had considerably higher wages than their continental counterparts, 
labour-saving capital investment in mechanization should have had a greater relative impact on 
TFP in Britain, other things being equal.  
[Table 2 near here] 
Yet the mechanisation of British coalfields lagged considerably behind their overseas 
rivals. While the United States was exceptional in mechanizing a high proportion of its 
bituminous coal production prior to the First World War, during the interwar years Britain’s 
major European competitors embarked on major mechanization programmes. Even when 
examined in terms of coal-cutting (which, as will be discussed below, portrays Britain in an 
unduly favourable light), Britain lagged well behind most major European producers. In 1930 
31.1 per cent of British coal was mechanically cut, compared to 93.8 per cent in the Ruhr; 91.4 
per cent in Belgium; 78.7 per cent in Czechoslovakia; over 72 per cent in France (Pas-de-
Calais); and 32.1 per cent in Polish Upper Silesia.
16 More importantly, while its principal 
competitors rapidly mechanized underground haulage, with locomotives becoming their 




The heterogeneity of `natural conditions’ also greatly complicates the task of assessing 
the relative performance of different production technologies by means of contemporary 
evidence from individual collieries or trials. The thickness, hardness, friability, inclination, and 
faulting of coal seams, together with floor and roof conditions, can all have a significant bearing 
on productivity and vary not just between coalfields, but between collieries, or even different  
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seams of the same colliery.
17 To minimise these difficulties, this paper uses results regarded by 
the British mining engineering community as broadly representative of typical colliery 
conditions. British mining engineers placed considerable emphasis on appraising alternative 
technologies via a process of `collective learning’, involving publishing data on experiments and 
experience with new methods, which were then submitted to verbal and written peer discussion. 
Both the papers and their discussion at regional meetings of mining engineers (together with 
subsequent written comments) were reproduced in a national Transactions of the federated 
regional mining engineering institutes.
18 Papers ranged from the experience of single mines to 
major exercises, such as an examination of underground conveying that drew data from 25 
collieries.
19 Research for this paper has involved a comprehensive review of all articles included 
in the Federation’s Transactions from its establishment to 1939 (together with their appraisal by 
the engineering community), plus other technical publications such as Colliery Engineering and 
The Colliery Guardian. Results reported below are selected to represent the consensus among 
mining engineers regarding both the potential of mechanized technology and the barriers to its 
introduction. 
The diffusion of mechanized undercutting of coal seams (sometimes supplemented by 
mechanised conveying of coal at the coalface) has been widely used as the yardstick for judging 
Britain’s coal mechanization record and regional variations in mechanization.
20 However, there 
are severe drawbacks in using these as proxies for the growth of mechanized mining. 
Mechanized mining was defined, even during this period, as the introduction of high throughput 
systems involving the entire cycle of getting the coal, conveying it to the loading road, 
transporting it by auxiliary haulage and then main haulage to the shaft, winding it to the surface 
and returning the empty tubs. As the Colliery Yearbook  noted in 1923, these `various stages are  
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interdependent and must therefore be properly synchronised. The rate of the flow of coal from 
the face to the surface and the return of the empty trams is restricted by the slowest process in 
the cycle’.
21
 Coal-cutters and, to a lesser extent, face conveyors, were often adopted in Britain for 
reasons not connected with throughput. Mechanized cutting offered three major advantages. 
First, it represented a `niche’ technology for very thin or hard seams, where manually 
undercutting the coal with a pick proved difficult (face conveyors also initially represented a 
niche technology - for thin seams where it was difficult to bring wagons along the face).
22 
Secondly, mechanized cutting was a quality-enhancing technology, as it produced a larger 
proportion of round coal, particularly in thin seams. This was more highly valued (where coal 
was not carbonized) on account of its greater thermal efficiency. Finally, coal-cutters offered 
substantial increases in throughput.  
The salience of mechanized cutting as a component in a mechanized mining system 
concerned only this final factor. However, especially during the early diffusion of coal-cutters in 
British mines, the first two factors generally proved the main motivations.
23 Taking coal-cutting 
as the yardstick for mechanization greatly exaggerates regional differences in the overall 
mechanization process. Coalfields had varying incentives to adopt cutters, depending on the 
thinness and hardness of their seams and the proportion of their coal that was carbonized. An 
extreme example was South Wales, where coal was particularly easy to bring down using hand-
methods and mechanization was therefore often led by face conveying rather than coal-cutting. 
Regional differences in the diffusion of cutting are consequently poorly correlated with those for 
downstream mechanization. Regressing county-level data for the proportion of coal face-
conveyed against the proportion mechanically-cut in 1936 produces an adjusted R
2 of only  
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0.377.
24 The relationship with mechanization further downstream is even weaker. For example 
by 1931 Scotland, which had pioneered cutters in thin seams, had 67 per cent of its coal 
mechanically cut, compared to a national average of 35 per cent. Yet only 12 per cent of coal 
was conveyed at the loading gate, a mere 3.6 percentage points above the British average.
25  
  The productivity advantages of mechanized coal-cutting and face conveying were, of 
course, considerable, but only where subsequent haulage arrangements allowed them to reach 
their potential throughput. From the early years of mechanization it became apparent that this 
was to be a major problem for British collieries. As one commentator noted in 1906, in thicker 
seams cutter output was restricted by the ability to clear coal from the face; only in thin seams 
did filling keep pace with cutting.
26 Face conveyors merely moved this problem one step further 
downstream. As the coal machinery manufacturer and consultant Sam Mavor noted, poor 
haulage was, `the rock on which ambitious schemes of face-conveying have not infrequently 
been wrecked… it is futile to install face machinery [producing an output] ... in excess of the 
capacity to transport it’.
27
[Table 3 near here] 
 As Table 3 shows, the proportion of coal conveyed beyond the face did not exceed a 
third of total output until 1938. Meanwhile locomotive or conveyor haulage further downstream, 
on secondary and main roadways, represented a negligible proportion of output throughout the 
interwar period. As a paper presented to the South Staffordshire and Warwickshire Institute of 
Mining Engineers noted, `Practically every machine-mining lay-out is determined by one 
limiting factor - haulage - and in very few cases can coal-face machinery work at maximum 
efficiency owing to this limiting factor.’
28  
While in continental Europe and the USA locomotives rapidly became standard, on the  
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eve of the Second World War there were only 16 in use throughout Britain’s 1,870 pits, despite 
the fact that they had been first introduced some 60 years earlier.
29 The first known underground 
locomotive, powered by compressed air, went into service at Durham’s Newbottle Colliery as 
early as 1878. However (in contrast to the Rhur, where they widely deployed) compressed air 
locomotives proved problematic in British mines. They were found to be unsuitable for Britain’s 
twisting and uneven underground roadways and were regarded as unreliable (possibly due to 
their low horse-power, which Ruhr collieries compensated for by using roadways with uniform 
inclines in favour of the load). Storage battery locomotives, introduced from around the end of 
the First World War, rapidly became widely used in overseas coalfields, as were “trolley” 
(overhead wire) and diesel locomotives, though again the requirement for straight roadways with 
even gradients generally prevented their use in British collieries.
30 Main roadway conveyors 
offered an alternative high-throughput technology, but again needed straight roadways, 
preventing their use for haulage to the shaft in British mines in all but a few instances.
31
 By the 1920s locomotives offered considerable advantages over the rope systems 
generally used in British collieries, on account of their much higher throughput and other 
important savings in power consumption, labour, flexibility in the locations served (which 
greatly reduced production losses from mining equipment breakdowns) and their ability to deal 
with temporary increases in throughput beyond their designated capacity.
32 Contemporary 
British studies indicated savings of up to 80 per cent from the replacement of endless-rope 
haulage by locomotives.
33 The locomotive’s crucial throughput advantage was the ability to haul 
large wagons. Rope haulage could only deal with low capacity `tubs’, as it was difficult to clip a 
large wagon onto a moving rope.
34 During the interwar years British tubs were only a fraction of 
the size typically used in Europe and the U.S. (where large wagons were successfully employed  
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even for thin seams).
35 The most extensive contemporary investigation, encompassing 22 pits in 
England and Scotland, found that 45 per cent of tubs were below 0.60 long tons [hereafter tons] 
capacity, while the average tub capacity of the pits surveyed was 0.65 tons.
36 While mechanized 
cutting and conveying expanded substantially during the following decade, tub capacity showed 
little change. Despite the observation of a 1927 paper by L. J. Barraclough (based on research 
visits to British and overseas coalfields), that tubs of 0.5 tons or less, `should be seen only in 
museums exhibiting mining antiquities’,
37 a follow-up survey in 1937 indicated an average load 
per tub of only 0.58 tons.
38  
Small tubs proved inefficient in a number of important respects. They constrained the 
capacity of conveyors that fed them, owing to congestion and the need to frequently switch 
between tubs. As one mining engineer stated, in discussion of Barraclough’s paper, `We found 
... that the tub capacity was nothing like sufficient to make the conveyor a paying proposition, so 
we took it out. It was standing idle half its time, because we had filled all the tubs we could get 
hold of’.
39 This problem became particularly severe under intensive mining, where conveyors 
delivered coal to central loading points at the rate of 1,000 tons or more per shift in many cases; 
during peak rushes one ton could arrive in 20 seconds. Small tubs were not practicable for such 
throughput; Barraclough estimated the optimum operation of modern conveyor systems required 
tubs holding at least two tons.
40
Small tubs also incurred substantial efficiency losses in their direct haulage operations. It 
was estimated in a 1915 discussion at the North of England Institute of Mining and Mechanical 
Engineers that using 0.5 ton tubs increased the laden weight of wagons carrying four tons of coal 
by 19.9 per cent and their unladen weight by 79.2 per cent compared to a single 4 ton wagon. 
Friction added to the efficiency gap; each 4 tons of coal entailed the friction of four large wheels  
  12 
(with efficient roller-bearings) with 4 ton wagons, as against 32 small wheels (with bearings 
generally of a very crude character) with 0.5 ton tubs. The overall impact of savings in friction 
and weight was thus considerable, it being estimated that the drawing power required to move 
80 tons of coal would be roughly halved by the move from 0.5 to 4 ton wagons.
41 One colliery 
estimated that the adoption of 5 ton wagons, together with associated changes in the pit’s rail 
gauge and winding system, would reduce combined underground and surface haulage costs by 
about 80 per cent compared to its 0.35 ton tubs.
42  
An extensive review of contemporary engineering papers and discussions indicates a 50 
per cent saving from the use of locomotives in combination with large tubs to be a lower-bound 
estimate. Poor British haulage productivity was reflected in high labour requirements: the 
proportion of British mineworkers engaged on haulage during the 1930s remained roughly 
constant at just over 20 per cent, while in the USA it was less than 5 per cent and in the 
Netherlands – which instituted an intensive programme of mechanization - it declined from 
26.96 per cent in 1926 to 12.41 per cent in 1937, with each haulage worker handling around 4-5 
times the tonnage of coal moved by his British counterpart.
43 Meanwhile the failure to 
mechanize haulage also increased the costs of delivering men, equipment, and materials to and 
from the face. A frequent grievance of miners was the long distances they had to travel 
underground on foot, walking over an hour each way in extreme cases. Yet rope-haulage usually 
made man-riding impractical.
44
Yet the most important impact of retaining rope haulage was the creation of bottlenecks, 
that limited the efficiency of mechanization further up-stream and blocked the full development 
of intensive mining. Concentrating extraction in a small area of coalface that was intensively 
worked proved key to achieving the potential productivity advantages of mechanisation.  
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Without such concentration, and the high throughput it produced, the heavy fixed costs of 
mechanized technology negated at least some of its potential savings.
45 For example a 1929 
analysis of 22 collieries using face conveyors revealed that the `intensively-mined’ collieries had 
an O/S to the main haulage that was 45.9 per cent greater than that for the other collieries in the 
sample.
46 An essential pre-requisite for truly intensive mining was a haulage system capable of 
dealing with the high throughput. Small wagons restricted concentration both by being 
unsuitable for centralised loading stations and by congesting underground roadways. The 
average haul from the shaft to loading points in British mines during the late 1930s was about 
one mile. Given a daily output of 1,000 tons, traffic density would be 400 tub-miles with five ton 





Despite the considerable potential savings and higher throughput from a move to large 
wagons hauled by locomotives, interrelatedness with underground mining layouts and roadway 
development systems prohibited their introduction. This is reflected in contemporary mine 
engineering reports, which identified large potential savings, but found that these were 
outweighed by the costs of modification. It was not the costs of scrapping and replacing the 
haulage system, tubs, and tracks that were identified as being prohibitive, but rather the much 
greater costs of straightening or replacing underground roadways.
48 As an official report noted, 
there was `great difficulty in making major alterations to the main lines of underground 
operations already at an advanced stage. Roadways …in a middle aged mine ... often represent a 
sum of money far in excess of the whole of the company’s share capital’.
49
Britain’s seams were relatively flat compared to some European coalfields and should,  
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therefore, have been more suitable for locomotives – which required reasonably level gradients. 
Yet the problem was not one of level seams but of level underground roadways. As an early 
post-war study by a National Coal Board official noted, `The most efficient method of main-
road haulage both for men and materials is by diesel or electric locomotive, but few pits in this 
country are designed for such working’.
50 British underground roadways followed the coal 
seams in often undulating and tortuous paths, along which locomotives could not operate.
51 
Continental mines, by contrast, generally used the `horizon mining’ system of cutting level 
roadways through the rock. Horizon mining was originally developed to cope with seams that 
were too steep for coal to be hauled along them. Yet as mine size grew during the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries it became the standard European mining technique even for 
relatively flat seams, as it offered various advantages over in-seam mining - improved 
ventilation, cost savings regarding roadway repairs and `ripping’,
 52 and, of crucial and growing 
importance, suitability for mechanized haulage.
53 By the twentieth century horizon mining had 
developed into a system of concentrated face workings, reached by carefully-engineered 
roadways cut through the rock at a steady slight upward incline from the shaft bottom (typically 
1 in 400 to 1 in 500 in the Ruhr and 1 in 300 in the Netherlands, where roller bearings were 
used). These roadways enabled even low horsepower locomotives to move large tonnages over 
considerable distances at high speeds, with sufficient throughput to meet the haulage 
requirements of mechanized, concentrated, mining.
54  
In Britain, by contrast, roadways continued to be developed along the seam, due to 
institutional interrelatedness between mine development systems and fragmented mineral rights 
(discussed below). Despite the growth in mine size over the nineteenth century, prior to 
mechanization the problems arising from the British system did not impose a particularly heavy  
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efficiency penalty. However, the system entailed much greater costs for mechanized mining, 
which relied on two key features of horizon mining, concentrated workings – that allowed coal-
cutting and other coal-face machinery to be employed at capacity - and straight, level, roadways, 
suitable for locomotive or conveyor haulage of that capacity output. Even those collieries that 
embarked on `integrated’ mechanization programmes were generally forced to restrict haulage 
improvements to the deployment of slightly larger wagons, compatible with rope haulage and 
existing layouts. For example in 1925 the Nostell Colliery in West Yorkshire embarked on a 
major programme of mechanization, encompassing the complete cycle of mining operations. 
Yet, despite spending £33,000 on wagons, the average weight of coal per tub only experienced a 
modest increase from 0.39 tons in 1927 to 0.55 tons in 1936.
55 Collieries found it more 
profitable to follow the second-best solution of working mechanised cutters and conveyors 
below capacity. Extensive time-studies conducted by the Ashington Coal Co. revealed that its 
endless rope systems created main haulage bottlenecks, limiting effective conveyor running time 
to only 72-73 per cent of its potential. Yet their replacement by locomotives would have 
required the driving of new roadways, which would have both incurred considerable expense 
and interfered with current mining operations.
56
Interwar British `mechanized mines’ thus constituted a technological compromise, aimed 
at achieving the maximum benefits from upstream mechanization within the capacity constraints 
of low throughput haulage systems. Between 1928 and 1936 the proportion of output 
mechanically cut and conveyed rose from 26 to 55 per cent and 12 to 48 per cent respectively. 
Yet O/S only increased by 10.6 per cent.
57 Furthermore, according to estimates by David 
Greasley, regions such as Durham and Northumberland - with the longest underground 
roadways (and, therefore, the greatest cost penalty from the rope haulage systems common to all  
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British coalfields) - achieved the lowest face multifactor productivity growth (despite their very 
different coalface mechanization records).
58Adoption of mechanized techniques in British mines 
represented a rational `second-best’ solution - maximising the returns from mechanisation within 
the constraints imposed by technological lock-in into extensive in-seam mining.
59 The degree to 
which British collieries optimized mechanisation even within these constraints is itself a subject 





Why had Britain become locked-in to a system of developing underground roadways 
along the line of the seam, despite the fact that it prevented the introduction of mechanised main 
haulage and, therefore, truly mechanised mining? For older pits, part of the answer lay in their 
great age and extensive legacy of previous workings. Britain’s interwar colliery stock was 
considerably older than that of any other major coal-producing nation, reflecting its growth peak 
in the mid-nineteenth century. In 1925 51.1 per cent of British miners were employed in 
collieries over 50 years old and only 26.9 per cent in mines opened since 1895.
61 Very old mines 
were often extremely difficult to mechanize. In addition to inappropriate underground layouts 
they often had shafts of too narrow diameter to accommodate high throughput; these could not 
generally be widened without temporarily closing the mine and incurring considerable costs.
62  
Yet this still left a substantial proportion of more recent mines, developed over the period 
when European coalfields had adopted horizon-mining. These should have been much more 
suitable for conversion to mechanisation and mass throughput. Shaft capacity for newer mines, 
while often less than optimal for mechanized mining, but was normally sufficient for such  
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systems to be introduced, as shown by the example of the post-nationalisation coal industry. 
Despite the further development of high throughput mining techniques, as late as the early 1980s 
the average diameter of British mine shafts, 5.7 metres, was not greatly in excess of that at the 
time of nationalisation, (typically ranging from 4.9 metres (or less) for older shafts to 6.4 metres 
for the best modern collieries).
 63 The highly-mechanised interwar Dutch industry had shafts of 
5.8 metres.
64 Meanwhile the Ruhr’s transition to mechanized mining involved existing shafts, 
that were considered relatively narrow by American standards. In some cases skip winding was 
introduced, though often simpler modifications were made – such as fitting additional decks to 
cages or fitting four cages into the same shaft.
 65 Mechanized haulage increased effective shaft 
capacity. For example, one British colliery found that each new one ton tub occupied the same 
space in its winding cage as two existing 7 cwt. tubs, enabling its daily output to be drawn in one 
shift rather than two. Meanwhile, replacement of the shaft’s cage winding system with skip 
winding enabled the colliery to employ 5 ton tubs, without widening the shaft.
66
Britain’s retention of in-seam mining during this period can be traced to its unique 
system of fragmented mineral royalties. European royalty practice generally developed from a 
tradition of crown mineral ownership, modified from the late eighteenth century to overcome the 
problems that would otherwise arise from the considerable subdivision of land in most European 
nations. Under this system the state owned mineral royalties and granted concessions to mining 
concerns.
67 Britain, by contrast, already had a well-established coal mining industry, together 
with a commercialised agricultural sector with relatively large land-holdings. It therefore 
maintained its system of vesting mineral ownership with the owners of the surface land. Most of 
Britain's current and former colonies followed British practice, but as land was generally held in 
very large estates this imposed few problems regarding fragmentation.   
  18 
Ben Fine has argued that the relationship between landowners and mineowners in Britain 
originally facilitated the rapid expansion of mines and high rates of extraction.
68 Similarly, 
Britain’s practice of developing underground roadways along the line of the seam had originally 
been efficient, given that its seams were mainly of moderate inclination and, for small pits using 
manual technology, it was cheaper to mine through coal than rock. However, from the late 
nineteenth century - as mine size expanded to encompass several royalties and technological 
change made horizon mining increasingly attractive – private royalties impeded the introduction 
of new technology and associated mining systems. The 1925 Royal Commission on the Coal 
Industry (Samuel Commission) found that the average British mine worked the coal of five 
mineral owners. Meanwhile the seams worked from any particular pit were not necessarily 
determined by efficiency considerations, but by the success of the mine-owner in obtaining 
leases.
 69  This problem was compounded for large collieries, where as many as 20 royalty 
owners might be involved.
70  
 Horizon mining involved concentrating workings and conveying coal from those 
workings to the shaft via a single, straight, high capacity underground roadway. Developing a 
straight roadway from the shaft to the coalface required access to the intervening land; a 
roadway that meandered to conform with surface land boundaries would not be suitable for the 
high throughput haulage systems required to deal with mechanised, concentrated, extraction. 
Any significant break in the straight line and uniform gradient would have a substantial impact 
on speed, load, and, therefore, throughput.  
Would this problem have been solved by efficient bargaining between mine and royalty 
owners? Coase’s seminal 1960 article, `The problem of Social cost’, shows that, given complete 
information and no transactions costs, negotiation between parties to an initially inefficient  
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market outcome, such as that produced by fragmented British royalties, will produce Pareto-
efficient solutions. Coase explicitely assumed zero transactions costs; indeed he subsequently 
stated that the chief significance of the `Coase theorem’ is in emphasising the importance of 
positive transactions costs in modifying the predictions of his theorem and the standard 
economic theory from which it is derived.
71 Yet this theorem has been interpreted by some 
commentators as asserting that however property rights are assigned we should observe only 
outcomes that are constained efficient in the sense that all potential gains from trade (net of 
transactions costs) are exploited.
72
The dangers of extending the Coase theorem to a world of positive transaction costs have 
been illustrated by Anderlini and Felli. Modelling  bargaining in the presence of transactions 
costs, they found that, even assuming complete information, the theorem no longer holds, as an 
efficient (or even Pareto-improving) outcome is no longer guaranteed.
73 Renegotiating mineral 
leases involved particularly heavy transactions costs, given the complexity of the agreements 
they represented between landowners and mineowners regarding access to, and removal of, 
coal.
74 For example, in evidence to the 1919 Royal Commission on the Coal Industry (Sankey 
Commission), the Chief Inspector of Mines, R. A. S. Redmayne, noted that transactions costs for 
renegotiating access to small plots of land often formed a high proportion of the overall cost of 
the leases in question, citing one case where access to mineral royalties valued at £350 involved 
negotiation costs of £84, despite it being a relatively straightforward transaction.
75
Gains from trade through negotiation were further inhibited by the absence of another 
critical assumption of the Coase theorem – complete information. The literature on `non-
cooperative’ bargaining models (as opposed to `cooperative’ bargaining theory, one of the 
axioms of which is that outcomes are efficient) indicates that bargaining is typically inefficient  
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in situations where each party holds relevant information unknown to the other party, such as 
their payoff from a successful agreement. This can lead to a failure to make mutually 
advantageous bargains, excessive delay, and other direct bargaining costs, as each bargainer 
incurs and imposes real costs to change the expected price to their advantage.
76
As noted above, assessing the expected profitability of mining investment projects  was 
an extremely complex task, many key factors being dependent on conditions in the colliery, or 
even seam, in question. Colliery owners, despite themselves facing incomplete information, 
were nevertheless much better placed to assess the expected impact of rationalization projects on 
colliery profitability than were royalty owners. Meanwhile royalty owners were often in a 
powerful bargaining position in that they held an effective veto over modifications to existing 
workings that violated current leases. Developing straight underground roadways from the shaft 
to the face would, under the British royalty system, typically involve crossing several royalties 
from which no coal would be mined.  Leases would have to be obtained for each area crossed 
and charges paid for `wayleave’ – the right to transport coal through the royalty. Landlords 
sought to limit wayleave rights as much as possible in order to ensure the maximum working of 
their own coal, sometimes limiting the amount of coal that could be transported via the wayleave 
to a certain percentage of the colliery’s output.
 77 If royalties were to be leased purely for 
haulage purposes it was in the financial interests of each landlord to seek wayleave charges 
which both compensated them for their lost potential income from coal extraction and reflected 
the monopoly value of their land’s intervening position between the shaft and coal-face.  
This gave royalty owners with sites in key locations great scope for `strategic hold-up’ to 
extract as much of the perceived likely increased profits from the scheme in question as they felt 
they could get away with; a practice noted by contemporary industry observers. For example,  
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the Chief Inspector of Mines informed the Sankey Commission that he had frequently come 
across cases where a strategically-placed royalty owner sought `to extract extortionate terms, 
either of wayleave or by unduly inflating the price.’
78 This continued to be reported as a serious 
problem during the 1920s and 1930s.
79  The cost penalties facing a royalty owner from the 
failure to secure agreement to a mine rationalization project were relatively slight. Most leases 
extant during the interwar period had been agreed during the era of relatively high coal prices 
prior to 1921 and, as they were set relative to the output, rather than value, of the coal produced, 
were inelastic to variations in colliery profits so long as the royalty continued to be worked. 
Thus, while colliery profits declined from more than twice the value of royalties during the five 
years prior to the First World War to about two thirds of their value during 1930-34, the average 
royalty had experienced only a slight absolute fall, from 5.64 d  to 5.34 d per ton.
80 Even if the 
colliery ceased working that particular royalty, the owner still received income, so long as the 
mine stayed in operation, due to a system of `minimum rents’, payable regardless of output, 
which again reflected market conditions at the time leases were taken out and appreciated 
relative to mining revenues during the interwar depression.
81
A review by the author of archival evidence on interwar coal-field rationalisation 
projects highlights the obstacles that fragmented royalties placed in the path of concentrated 
workings. The Mining Association, the South Yorkshire collieries (in a scheme for a holding 
company for the coalfield), a leading mining engineer (presenting a provisional scheme for 
amalgamating collieries in south-west Lancashire), and the Chairman of Amalgamated 
Anthracite Collieries, all drew attention to current royalty patterns and difficulties in 
renegotiating them as key factors impeding rationalisation.
82 A technical report to the Coal 
Mines Reorganisation Commission, concerning a proposed colliery amalgamation for the Fife  
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area of Scotland, emphasised the barriers to the project imposed by current fragmented leases. A 
simultaneous merger of royalties covered by the scheme was suggested, via the formation of a 
royalties company in which each royalty owner would hold shares and which would charge the 
merged colliery company a flat royalty rate per ton. Yet the report acknowledged that difficulties 
in reaching agreement with all royalty owners would probably block such an initiative, despite 
its obvious efficiency advantages.
83  
The same difficulty arose at the level of the individual colliery, even in the relatively 
new coalfields where new mine development had been concentrated during the early twentieth 
century. For example a large colliery in South Yorkshire, one of Britain’s more recently-
developed coalfields, wished to concentrate extraction in a particular area, producing a tonnage 
on which royalties would greatly exceed minimum rents. However, the £11,000 that it would 
have to pay each year in minimum rents on its un-worked leases constituted a powerful 
disincentive.
84 Such calculations faced many collieries; as a 1938 article on mechanized mining 
noted, `Where feasible, the aim is to work a quota of tonnage from each leasehold to cover the 
minimum rent. Where the dead rent is allowed to accumulate, the charge is apt to become 
onerous particularly if the property is extensive’.
85  
No comprehensive information is available on the locations of the 16 locomotives 
operating in British mines by 1938. Yet fragmentary documentary evidence indicates that most 
recorded cases of successful and sustained adoption of locomotives were in Scotland, where 
royalties were substantially more concentrated than in England.
86 These included the Gilmerton 
Colliery;
 the Coltness Iron Co.’s Kingshill and Douglas collieries; and the Alloa Coal Co.’s 
Devon Colliery.
87 The Kingshill Colliery was a new pit, sinking of the first shaft having been 
completed in 1918. Following the introduction of locomotive haulage as part of an integrated  
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cycle of concentrated mechanized mining, it achieved an output of two tons per man-shift in 
around 1928 (compared to an average of 1.18 tons for Scottish, and 1.06 tons for all British, 
mines) from a relatively narrow seam.
88 The Devon Colliery, by contrast, was an extremely old 
mine, yet despite its great age an electric locomotive was successfully introduced there by the 
Alloa Coal Co., which had adopted a policy of owning the royalties it mined.
89 One successful 
instance of an English mine adopting locomotives occurred in Cumberland following the 
acquisition of Whitehaven Collieries by the Coltness Iron Co. in 1937. However, in this case 
royalties did not pose a problem, as the seam was located under the Irish Sea.
90     
 
              VI 
 
As the world’s main exporter of a bulk raw material, the British coal industry inevitably 
faced severe problems in adjusting to a new interwar economic environment of rising 
international competition, protectionism, and stagnant demand. Meanwhile the industry’s 
unusually high sunk costs and the long lifespan of its fixed capital delayed the exit of inefficient 
mines, while adversarial industrial relations, flawed government intervention, and, very 
probably, poor or indifferent entrepreneurship for many concerns, placed further barriers in the 
path of efficient restructuring. This article has not sought to dismiss or diminish the importance 
of these factors, but to demonstrate that there were also problems inherent in the technical and 
institutional systems of British coal mining, which, while originally rational, later came to 
constituted powerful barriers to modernization in their own right.  
Problems of technical and institutional interrelatedness both considerably slowed 
mechanization and reduced the productivity impact of the mechanised technology that was 
introduced. Arguments that if the industry had been free from government intervention it could  
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have achieved productivity growth close to the European average by concentrating production in 
more environmentally-favoured coalfields are, therefore, incorrect. For example a major feature 
of the Ruhr’s rationalization programme was the concentration of mining operations in a third of 
the number of coal faces previously worked.
91 In Britain royalties constituted an effective 
barrier both to the concentration of extraction in particular faces and to the development of 
haulage facilities capable of removing coal from concentrated workings. 
The problems of Britain’s interwar coal industry constitute an example of the more 
general phenomenon, identified by Veblen and Gerschenkron, of Britain paying the penalty 
during the early twentieth century for having earlier taken the lead in industrialisation.
92 High 
degrees of technical and institutional interrelatedness were characteristic features of Britain’s 
staple industries.
93 Further research into the impact of inherited production systems and 
institutional arrangements, through path dependence effects, might go some way towards 
providing a more general explanation of their rejection of the new technologies adopted by 
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TABLE 1 
OUTPUT PER MAN-SHIFT (O/S) IN THE MAIN COALFIELDS OF BRITAIN AND 
CONTINENTAL EUROPE, 1913-1937 (metric tons; ranked by growth is O/S,1913-37) 
 
                             O/S             % increase in O/S 
     1913
d 1923 1929 1937  1913-1937   1923-1937   1923-1929
Netherlands 0.82 0.70 1.25 1.77 116.3  153.1 77.9
Ruhr
a 0.95 0.86 1.27 1.63 72.1 89.1 47.8
German Upper Silesia  1.15 0.63 1.38 1.93 68.0  208.8 120.3
Poland (excluding Karwin)  1.14 0.58 1.26 1.82 59.6  216.1 119.1
Aachen
a 0.76 0.61 0.95 1.14 49.6 87.1 55.6
Czechoslovakia 0.97 0.74 1.04 1.45 49.2  95.3 40.5
German Lower Silesia
b 0.67 0.43 0.84 0.98 45.9 128.0 97.2
Belgium 0.54 0.47 0.58 0.78 45.4  66.7 22.8
Lancashire, North Staffs. & Cheshire  0.79 0.68 0.90 1.06 33.5  55.2 31.7
Saar 0.80 0.64 0.84 1.05 31.3  64.9 30.8
France (excluding Saar)  0.70 0.55 0.69 0.83 18.8  52.3 26.9
Saxony
a 0.71 0.47 0.66 0.84 18.8 78.4 39.4
South Wales & Monmouthshire
c 0.89 0.76 1.04 1.05 17.8 36.8 35.9
North Derbyshire & Nottinghamshire  1.28    N/A 1.23 1.48 15.5              N/A              N/A
Northumberland 1.02 0.79 1.15 1.18 15.5  49.1 44.4
Scotland 1.08 0.88 1.21 1.22 12.7  38.0 36.8
South Derbyshire, Leicestershire,  
Cannock Chase & Warwickshire 
            
     1.09
          
    N/A 1.08 1.20 10.7 
              
             N/A
           
             N/A
Yorkshire  1.22    N/A 1.19 1.34 9.5              N/A              N/A
Durham 1.16 0.82 1.10 1.10 -4.6  34.7 34.1
Average 0.93 0.66 1.03 1.26 36.07  90.85 53.82
Standard deviation (all areas)  0.21 0.14 0.23 0.34 29.07  57.54 32.00
Standard deviation (UK areas only)  0.16 0.07 0.11 0.15 10.55  8.94 4.79
 
Notes:  
a1923 values are for 1924, as data for 1923 are not available. 
b 1913 figure includes  
            East Upper Silesia. 
c Data are for February-January of each year. 
d 1913 values for UK  
            regions are for June 1914. 
Sources: United Kingdom, Annual Report of H.M. Chief Inspector of Mines (1914-38); 
Statistical Tables Relating to British Foreign Trade and Industry (1924-30), Part II: Principal 
Industries, Production and Trade (P.P. 1930-31, XXXI); NA, POWE22/174, Table, n.d., c.1944.  
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TABLE 2 
CHANGES IN MECHANISATION AND PRODUCTION COSTS IN BRITISH COALFIELDS 




 Increase in percentage  
 of coal mechanically: 
      Change in cost per ton of  
     coal produced (%): 
   Conveyed
 a               Cut       Labour     Other        Total
Lancashire, North Staffordshire & 
Cheshire 61 51 -14.29 -2.89  -10.80
Yorkshire 45 34 -9.16 -1.86  -7.01
Northumberland 36 49 -5.81 3.36  -2.46
Scotland 32 23 0.22 -3.07  -0.89
South Wales & Monmouthshire
 b
24 17 -3.36 2.16 -1.47
Durham 16 22 -1.85 -5.38  -3.17
Great Britain  39 34 -7.65 -3.29  -6.24
 
Notes: 
a 1928-37 (coalfield-level data on mechanical conveyance are not available before 1928). 
b Data are for February-January of each year. 
 Sources: N. K. Buxton, `Coalmining,’ 48-79 in N. K. Buxton and D. H. Aldcroft (eds), British 
Industry Between the Wars. Instability and Industrial Development 1919-1939 (1979), pp. 64-
57;  
United Kingdom, Annual Report of H.M. Chief Inspector of Mines for the Year Ended 31
st 
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TABLE 3 
THE PERCENTAGE OF COAL MECHANICALLY CUT AND CONVEYED IN BRITAIN, 
1903-1938 
 
Year  Mechanically cut Face conveyed Gate conveyed  Locomotive conveyed on 
    main/secondary haulage
a  
1903  2.3 N/A N/A                 0 
1909  5.2 N/A N/A                 0 
1913  8.5 N/A N/A                               0 
1920  13.2 N/A N/A                               0 
1924  18.7 N/A N/A                              0 
1927  23.3 N/A N/A                               0 
1928  25.9 11.8 N/A                               0 
1929  27.9 14.4 N/A                               0 
1930  31.1 17.4 5.8                               0 
1931  35.0 21.6 8.4                               0 
1932  38.5 25.2 10.5                               0 
1933  42.4 30.0 13.4                               0 
1934  47.0 36.9 19.1                               0 
1935  51.0 43.0 24.4                               0 
1936  55.0 47.9 29.5                               0 
1937  57.0 51.1 33.2                               0 
1938  59.5 54.1 36.2                               0 
 
Notes: N/A = not available. 
a Derived from data on the number of locomotives in use in British mines, which stood at 
16 in 1939, implying a percentage contribution to aggregate tonnage hauled that was not 
significantly different from zero. 
Source: United Kingdom, Annual Report of H.M. Chief Inspector of Mines (1904-39); NA, 
COAL 22/174, paper T.A.C. 9, 3 October 1944. 
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